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ACCRUAL PROBLEMS IN TAX ACCOUNTING

Alfred E. Holland*
TYPES OF UNCERTAINTY AFFECTING AccRuAL

ITE frequently at the end of a taxable year some u~certainty
qualifies the eventual payment or receipt of an. obligation. An
obligor may refuse to pay the debt for any number of reasons.
There may be disagreement as to the amount which is due; the obligation may not appear collectible; or there may be some other contingency
which makes eventual receipt or payment appear uncertain at the
time. This uncertainty presents a problem to the taxpayer when he
closes his books at the end of the year. Should such an uncertain
item be entered on the books as income for the present year, or should
entry be deferred until some future year when less uncertainty may
exist? Has an obligation become sufficiently certain to warrant recognition as an expense or loss incurred in the present year, or should
accrual be postponed until it becomes more certain in a future year?
If the problem is not passed over completely, the a~swers of theoretical writers in accounting to these question~ are usually deceptively
simple. If an obligation is still highly contingent it is said not to be
proper to recognize it as income for the present year. On the other
hand, an obligation which is sufficiently definite and certain is said
to deserve immediate recognition.1 The terms used, ''highly contingent" and "sufficiently definite," are both relative and the one shades
into the other by degrees. At some point along this scale the degree
of contingency becomes so small that the obligation is sufficiently
definite for recognition by accrual. The theoreticians make no attempt

Q
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1 PATON, EssBNTlALs OF AccouNTING 326 (1938); KBsTBn, AI>vANCBD AccoUNTING
416 (1946).
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to locate this point but merely tell the accountant to base his judgment
op the circumstances of each case.
The practicing accountant, in reporting_ for business purposes, is
forced to make a somewhat more definite decision. For the balance
sheet or the profit and loss statement to reflect properly the true condition of the business, accrual is necessary in some instances. Obligations which involve only a small degree of contingency should
be recognized by accrual. Such an accrual is usually explained in a
footnote describing the situation in whatever detail is thought necessary. If more than a slight contingency is present the item will not
be accrued, but a footnote will be used to show that' a contingent item
of income or expense exists.2 In this manner the ultimate decision is
passed on to the persons for whom the balance sheet or profit and loss
statement is prepared. This is not an evasion of responsibility by the
accountant but a well-recognized method of achieving a desired result.
While the accepted functions of accounting include both interpretation and reporting, the ultimate interpretation must be made by the
persons who use the material furnished by the accountant. Thus, in
a doubtful case, by presenting the facts of the situation and a suggested
solution, the accountant gives the ultimate interpreters a more accurate report upon which to base their conclusions than would be possible
without the use of such footnotes.
- In accounting for income tax purposes the questions posed must
be answered and decisions must be made. The taxpayer must decide
whether an item is to be accrued, and the courts must pass on the
correctness of his decision. No refuge can be taken in theoretical
statements, nor can footnotes be used to pass the responsibility for the
decision to someone else. At the end of the taxable year the taxpayer
(usually the attorney or accountant advising him) must decide whether
the obligation is "too highly contingent" or "sufficiently definite" for
accrual. Frequently the taxpayer acts at his peril. If a decision to
postpone accrual of a liability is in later years found in error by the
courts, the statute of limitations may prevent amendment of the return
for the taxable year in which the deduction should have been claimed.
If a decision to report a receivable in the present year is later found to
be in error, claim for refund may be barred. In this manner the taxpayer is forced to make a definite decision and is held to his election.
2 KESTER, ADVANCED AccoUNTING

419 (1946).
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There is, however, in some situations, one method by which the
taxpayer may pass the responsibility for the decision to the bureau or
the courts. He may claim a deduction for an expense in each of the
several years and let the bureau disallow all but one deduction. This
is an expensive method of solving the problem because interest must
be paid on the deficiencies which will be found for all but the proper
year. Thus in some situations relief from the responsibility of acting
at his peril may be purchased by the taxpayer, but at a considerable
price.
Since the taxpayer must decide, he looks to the previous decisions
to see whether the courts have found similar obligations sufficiently
definite for accrual. As there are thousands of decided cases in which
this question has been considered, either directly or indirectly, decisions concerning analogous situations often are found. Frequently,
however, altogether too many precedents exist, and the searche:i; may
then become lost in a maze of contradictory decisions and statements,
as there are many conflicts between decisions of the various circuits,
between circuits and the Tax Court, and between dicta and the actual
holdings. Or, since the possible fact situations when considered in
relation to the circumstances appear to be numberless, a precedent
may not be found at all. And above all, it must be realized that the
question is really one of degree; what one person or court will consider
contingent, another will call definite.
While for all these reasons the use of previously decided cases is
unsatisfactory, the taxpayer has nothing else which he can use. The
general statements of the accountants and courts are of little value in
deciding the specific problem confronting him-namely, is this particular item sufficiently definite for accrual? His only recourse is to
survey the previous decisions of the courts in analogous situations, if
any can be found, and hope that the court passing on his case will
agree.
In many situations there have been sufficient cases in which the
courts have agreed that general trends in the decisions can be observed
and some of these trends are so distinct and pronounced that they may
be considered to have become rules of law. In some situations the
courts have evolved legal tests which they apply in determining
whether items are sufficiently definite for accrual. In other situations
no trends can be discerned, and all that can be said is that the courts
will consider the whole situation and will allow accrual if the obligation
is not too highly contingent.
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There are five principal manners in which an obligation, receivable
or payable, may be too highly contingent to warrant accrual: (1) the
existence of any liability at all may be uncertain; (2) the liability may
be contingent because its existence depends on the happening of a
future contingent event; (3) both the taxpayer and a third party may
claim the right to receive the payments; ( 4) the amount to be received
or paid may be uncertain; or (5) the obligation may not appear
collectible.
The purpose of this article is to survey the general trends which
do exist in the handling of each of these situations by the courts and
to set out those in which a court's disposition of a case can, to some
extent, be predicted.3 While this will be of limited value to a taxpayer
in a specific situation faced with the necessity of choosing the proper
year for accrual, it should afford something of a standard by which
he can measure the contingency and upon which he can base his
choice.

A. Existence of Any Liability Uncertain
In attacking the problem of whether an item of income or expense
may be accrued, the first consideration usually is whether a definite
liability exists. It is frequently stated by writers and courts that
existence of a definite liability is necessary prior to accrual of any
obligation.4
The origin of this view is easily traced to a statement of the
Supreme Court in United States v. Anderson.5 However, when carefully examined, the statement in that case seems to be a dictum. There
the taxpayer was engaged in manufacturing and selling munitions.
A tax was levied on the sale of munitions made in 1916 but was not
due and payable until 1917. The taxpayer set up a reseI"'.'e for the tax
in 1916 but claimed a deduction of the amount as an expense i~ its•
3 It is recognized by the writer that under the present system of review of tax cases a
question cannot safely be considered as settled until it has been passed upon by the Supreme
Court. However, the long delay usually involved in getting a Supreme Court qecision on a
tax question makes it necessary that meanwhile decisions of the lower courts be accepted in
many instances as qualifiedly settling the question. For this reason some questions will be
considered reasonably well settled in the absence of a Supreme Court holding if a sufficient
number of decisions of the lower courts have agreed.
·
42 MERTENS, LAW OF INcoME TAXATION, §12.61 (1942): "ExrsTENcE OF DEFINITE
U,AllILITY AS. EssENCE OF AccRuAL. A non-existent liability cannot be accrued. Accordingly
it is necessary in each case to determine whether a liability has been created." MAGILL, TAXAllLE INcoME 198-200 (1945); Security Flour Mills v. Comr., 321 U.S. '281, 64 S.Ct. 596
(1944).
·
5 269 U.S. 422, 46 S.Ct. 131 (1926).
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return for 1917, the year in which the tax was actually paid. In holding that the deduction could be taken only in 1916 the Court seemingly based its decision on the broad principle that related items of
income and expense must be accounted for in the same fiscal year, and
stated that the "appellee's true income for the year 1916 could not
have been determined without deducting from its gross income for the
year the total cost and expenses attributable to the production of that
income during the year." But, since the taxpayer had argued that the
tax could not be accrued as an expense prior to when it was assessed
and became due, the Court went on to say that it was also true "that in
advance of the assessment of a tax, all the events may occur which fix
the amount of the tax and determine the liability of a taxpayer to pay
it." 6 Other courts quickly seized upon this statement as establishing
a basic rule that an obligation is not sufficiently definite for accrual
until all events occur which fix the amount and determine the liability.7 Consideration of the requirement of a fixed amount as a necessary
antecedent to accrual will be deferred for the present and attention
given to the requirement of a definite liability.
The interpretation by the lower courts of the statement as a basic
requirement for accrual was confirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas 17. North Texas Lumber Co. 8 There the taxpayer gave
a purchaser a ten-day option to purchase its timber lands for a specified
price. The purchaser was solvent and able to make the purchase. On
the same day the title was examined and found satisfactory to the
purchaser. Having arranged for the money needed, on December 30,
1916, the purchaser notified the taxpayer that the option would be
exercised. On that day the taxpayer ceased lumbering operations and
withdrew all employees from the land. On 'January 5, 1917, the
papers required to effect the transfer were delivered, the purchaser
paid the purchase price, and the transaction was closed. The taxpayer
kept its accounts on the accrual basis and treated the profits as income
for 1916. In a very short opinion the Court held that income did not
arise in 1916 because "unconditional liability of vendee for the purchase price was not created in that year" as there had not been a tender
of title or possession or a demand of the purchase price. 9 If this stateG Id. at 440,441.
7 Block & Kohner

Mercantile Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 19_30) 37 F. (2d) 877;
Naitove v. Comr., (App. D.C. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 949; Seabright Woven Felt Co. v. Ham,
(D.C. Me. 1930) 38 F. (2d) 114.
·
s 2s1 u.s. 11, so s:ct. 184 (1930).
9 Id. at 13.
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ment were to be accepted_ in its fullest implications there would be
little reason to examine the proposition further. Neither income nor .
expense could be accrued until unconditional- liability for the purchase
price was created. Liability of the purchaser in this case was considered
conditional even though everything had occurred to make a completed
sale except formal tender of a title which already had been found
satisfactory to the purchaser. It would be hard to imagine a stricter
requirement of absolute certainty.
From the time of the Anderson and North Texas Lumber Co.
cases to the present day, courts have repeatedly stated that all events
must occur to fix the liability of the obligor before an obligation can
be r~cognized by accrual on a taxpayer's books of account.10 However,
the extremely strict requirement of unconditional liability as set forth
in the North Texas Lumber Co. case has been relaxed considerably
and the courts no longer speak of unconditional liability, but now say
merely that liability must be present.11
As this rule requiring the presence of liability is no longer challenged and efforts now are directed toward showing that liability is
uncertain in the cases before •the court, the next step is to examine
the general types of situations in which the courts have, or have not,
found liability to exist.
When either the taxpayer or the obligor expressly admits that he
owes the debt, liability obviously exists.
Next comes the situation where the obligor denies that he owes
anything to the taxpayer. In theory the denial of liability by the obligor
does not necessarily denote its absence and, if the existence of liability
is the test, it would seem that liability could be found to exist and
accrual would be proper regardless of the denial. But in actual practice
denial of liability by the obligor has the effect of preventing accrual
of income by the taxpayer. The courts always seem to find what they
declare is sufficient uncertainty as to the existence of liability to make
accrual improper.12
lO

Security Flour Mills Co. v. Comr., 321 U.S. 281, 64 S.Ct. 596 (1944); Lucas v.

Am. Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 50 S.Ct. 202 (1930); Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc. v. Comr.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 125 F. (2d) _607; Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d,
1934) 72 F. (2d) 399.
11 Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 607; Est.
of Alexander, 47 B.T.A. 50 (1942), affd., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 100; Am. Hotels
Corp., 46 B.T.A. 629 (1942).
12Ky. & Ind. Terminal Ry. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 6th, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 738, cert. den.,
286 U.S. 557, 52 S.Ct. 639 (1932); Am. Hotels Corp., 46 B.T.A. 629 (1942); Jamaica
Water Supply Co., 42 B.T.A. 359 (1940).
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If the taxpayer denies that he owes the obligation, he cannot accrue
it as an expense.13 It seems elementary that he should not be able
to claim a deduction for an expense while simultaneously claiming
that the obligation does not exist. This presence of conflicting positions
is usually made the basis for refusing to allow accrual in such cases.
Also present, but not usually articulated by the courts, is the consideration that liability may not exist in fact. However, the question has been
litigated frequently and, in spite of repeated holdings that an obligation
which is denied cannot be accrued, the cases continue.14 This continued insistence by taxpayers might be attributable to the denial of
deductions for funds placed in reserve for eventual payment if liability
of the taxpayer is admitted or established by court decree in a later
year.111 The use of reserves for this purpose is so widespread and so
well established that taxpayers may be unable to dismiss from their
minds the conviction that it is essentially unfair not to allow them to
claim some kind of deduction for expenses which they are contesting
but expect to pay eventually. Whatever the reason, the cases continue
to be brought before the courts.
If the obligor neither expressly admits nor denies the existence of
the liability, the claim is examined to see if a legally enforceable obligation is present.16 If, in the opinion of the court, a legal obligation is
present, accrual may be proper; if it is thought that no such obligation
exists, accrual is forbidden. This seems so obvious that to state it
appears useless, but its statement points up the effect of a denial of
liability on the proper time for accrual. If there is no denial the situation is closely examined to discover whether a legally enforceable
obligation is present; if a denial is interposed the situation is not
examined but the denial itself has the effect of preventing accrual. This
indicates that more is required than a situation in which liability probably will be found by a court, and that accrual will not be proper unless
the situation is such that a denial is so improbable that the obligor's
silence is considered an implied admission of liability. Then the
existence of a right to receive payment and a duty of the obligor to
make payment seems not to be enough; it appears necessary also that
13 Security Flour Mills Co. v. Comr., 321 U.S. 281, 64 S.Ct. 596 (1944); Dixie Pine
Products Co. v. Comr., 320 U.S. 516, 64 S.Ct. 364 (1944).
14 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Magruder, (D.C. Md. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 156.
111 Lucas v. Am. Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 50 S.Ct. 202 (1930).
16 Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc. v. Comr., 125 F. (2d) 607 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942); Bauer
Brothers Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 6th, 1931) 46 F. (2d) 874, cert. den., 283 U.S. 850, 51
S.Ct. 560 (1931); East Coast Motors, Inc., 35 B.T.A. 212 (1936).
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either the duty be expressly admitted or the claim be such that an
implied admission is found. The statement of the courts that before
accrual is proper "all events must occur to fix the liability of the
obligor" now appears to mean that liability must not only exist but all
doubt of its existence must have been removed by express or implied
admission of the obligor. This theory of the meaning of the expression
"all events necessary to fix liability" has not been voiced by the courts
but seems to be the net effect of the decisions. As it is a general statement derived from consideration of the results of the decisions, not the
statements of the courts in the decisions, there is no convenient way
to support it by citation.
Where the obligor not only denies liability but contests the
existence of liability by court action, there can be no accrual of income
by the taxpayer as the courts always find the existence of liability too
uncertain. 17 This is not to say that the existence of any court action
pertaining to the obligation is sufficient evidence of uncertainty to
make accrual improper in all cases. There are situations in which the
obligor may be contesting the amount of the obligation or· some other
factor and accrual will still be proper.18 Consideration of such cases
will be deferred until the requirement of certainty in amount is discussed. But, whenever the existence of liability has been contested
in a court action no accrual has ever been found proper. Courts which
refuse to find a legal liability when the obligor merely denies that he
is liable would hardly be expected .to hold otherwise when he actually
contests liability in court.
In the opposite situation, where the taxpayer contests his liability
in a court action, accrual is always refused.10 Here, along with the
feeling that a definite obligation cannot exist while liability is being
disputed in court, there is also involved the rule that a taxpayer may
11 United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 56 S.Ct. 353
(1936), rehear. den., 297 U.S. 727, 56 S.Ct. 495 (1936); Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v.
Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 399; Jamaica Water Supply Co., 42 B.T.A. 359
(1940).
1s Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290, 52 S.Ct. 529 (1932).
19Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Comr., 320 U.S. 516, 64 S.Ct. 364 (1944); Lucas v. Am.
Code Co., Inc., 280 U.S. 445, 50 S.Ct. 202 (1930); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 4 T. C.
140 (1944). When the taxpayer is seeking to postpone the deduction to a later year than
that in which the claim arises it is necessary that the liability be disputed in good faith. If the
court finds no grounds for the dispute a postponement of accrual to the date of the final
judgment will be denied. Thome, Neale & Co., -13 B.T.A. 490 (1928); McCabe Lathe &
Machine Co., 9 B.T.A. 1137 (1928).
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not claim a deductiQn for an expense which he is simultaneously claiming he should not pay.
Whether liability is contested by the taxpayer or the obligor, accrual
is not proper until the termination of the litigation or until a settlement
is reached. 20 Litigation is not terminated for this purpose until all
possible appeals have been taken or liability has become final by the
expiration of time to appeal. 21 In other words, a final judgment which
cannot be carried further is required.
It would seem that if a taxpayer, after having been adjudged liable
to pay an obligation, decided not to appeal, he could deduct the expense
at once rather than wait until the expiration of the time allowed for
appeal. No case has been found by the writer in which this possibility
was considered. If the taxpayer definitely acknowledged liability there
would seem to be no objection to accrual before expiration of time to
appeal.
In one type of case the Tax Court appears to have made an exception to the rule that accrual is not proper so long as existence of liability
is contested in court. If the suit is such that the decree can be considered a declaration that the obligor has withheld property already
owned by the taxpayer, accrual prior to final termination of the litigation has been allowed. 22 The theory is that in such a case the court
decree adds nothing to the rights which already exist but is merely a
confirmation of rights already in being. In this manner a distinction
is made between denial of liability to pay an obligation running to the
taxpayer and a denial of a duty to turn over to the taxpayer property
which already belongs to him. In the first situation denial is found
sufficient to prevent accrual; in the second it is not. This theory, sometimes called the "pre-existing rights" theory, has met with only limited
approval by the courts. Even in the few cases where it has been
accepted its application gives much trouble because of the uncertainty
which exists during the course of any litigation as to the form the final
decree of the court will take and the difficulty in distinguishing a final
20 Ky. & Ind. Terminal Ry. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 6th, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 738, cert. den.,
286 U.S. 557, 52 S.Ct. 639 (1932); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 4 T.C. 140 (1944);
Jamaica Water Supply Co., 42 B.T.A. 359 (1940).
21 United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 56 S.Ct. 353
(1936), rehear. den., 297 U.S. 727, 56 S.Ct. 495 (1936); Liebes & Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A.
9th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 932; Lepham Bros. Co., 45 B.T.A. 793 (1941).
22 Est. of Alexander, 47 B.T.A. 50 (1942), affd., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 100;
William R. Hopkins, 41 B.T.A. 1292 (1940); Goforth et al., 32 B.T.A. 1206 (1935).
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decree which merely declares ownership from one which is an adjudication of liability for a claimed obligation.
Liability is generally taken to require the presence of a legally
enforceable obligation. Only one case has been found by the writer
in which this was not required. 23 There the taxpayer had accrued on
its books uncollected usurious interest due it from a corporation owned
and controlled by the same interests which controlled the taxpayer.
The circumstances were such that it was expected that the accrued
interest would be paid. In ruling that the amounts so accrued constituted taxable income for that year, the court stated that the question
depended "not so much . . . upon the legal right to enforce collection
as upon the existing probability of its being received." 24 The court
rejected the accepted test of the existence of definite liability, generally
taken to mean a legally enforceable obligation, and considered the
presence of a legally enforceable obligation merely one of the factors
bearing on the real consideration, whether there was a reasonable
expectancy of payment. While this is perhaps the view of many business men-that the value of the promise lies more in the expectation
that it will be performed than in the legal remedies available in case
of non-performance-it does not seem likely that the courts will depart
from the more definite and easily applied test of the presence of a legal
obligation. The result reached in this particular case might be passed
over because, in the very peculiar situation present, payment of the
obligation was assured by" the identity of the interests controlling both
the obligor and the taxpayer. In such a situation the presence of a
legally enforceable obligation would not serve to increase the probability of payment.
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the courts have
evolved a definite requirement that legal liability must exist before
accrual will be found proper. There are strong indications that not
only must this liability exist but either its existence must be recognized
by express admission or the situation must be such that denial is so
improbable that the obligor's silence is considered an implied admission. In any event more is required than merely the presence of a
situation where, if the proposition were to be submitted to a court,
liability of the debtor would be found. The existence of liability must
23 Barker v. Magruder,
2 4 Id. at 123. ·

(App. D.C. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 122.

TAX AccouNTING

1949]

159

be made definite and certain. For this it is required (in the opinion
of the writer) that either the debtor must expressly admit liability, or
such a situation must be present that admission will be implied, or a
court must have found liability in a final adjudication. This is the
legal test which has been evolved over the years. It is used by the
courts, perhaps sometimes unconsciously, in all situations where there
is an uncertainty qualifying the eventual payment of an obligation.
Unless the obligation is found to meet this test, accrual will be held
improper.
B.

Liability Subject to a Contingency

An employer may agree to pay an employee a bonus based on a
percentage of the profits made during the year, but with a provision
that if the employee does not remain with the £rm for the following
five years he will lose his right to receive it. A baseball club may
contract to pay a certain amount to another club for a player, but with
a provision that the obligation will be cancelled if the player should
fail to report for the next season. A client may agree to pay an attorney
a definite fee, but only if the suit is won and recovery is had. The condition may be expressed as either subsequent or precedent. The factor
which pistinguishes the problem illustrated by these hypothetical
situations is that the liability of the taxpayer or obligor is subject to the
happening of a contingent event which may occur after the end of the
taxable year. This is not to be confused with the situation where liability is doubtful at the end of the taxable year because of events which
have already occurred. If events have already occurred which raise
doubt of the existence of liability, the liability should not be spoken
of as contingent (although it frequently is so described) but should
be termed doubtful or uncertain. In the class of cases now to be considered, the liability can properly be designated as contingent because
its existence depends on the occurrence or non-occurrence of a future
contingent event. In such cases is it proper to accrue income or expense
at the end of the taxable year?
A general answer to this question would be that accrual is improper
where liability is contingent.25 The usual statement is that a deduction
2 5 Est. of Lynch v. Comr., (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 747; Comr. v. Blaine, McKay,
Lee Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 201; Cassatt v. Comr., (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 137 F.
(2d) 745, affg. 47 B.T.A. 400 (1942); Harrington Co., 6 T.C. 720 (1946); John Graff Co.,
39 B.T.A. 379 (1939).
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for an expense or a loss is not to be allowed until the liability becomes
fixed and certain, and that income may not be recognized by accrual
so long as the right to receive it is contingent. While this is well
established as a statement of the general rule, the statement must be
qualified by the requirement that the contingency be a substantial
one.26 Some contingencies are sufficient to prevent accrual prior to
their occurrence or the expiration of the time allowed for their occurrence. Others are considered not sufficiently substantial to warrant
deferment of accrual.
Care must be taken to distinguish the situation in which the contingency exists from the time liability first arises from that in which
there is an entirely new transaction which reduces or extinguishes
liability. Such new transactions are entirely separate and have no effect
on the accrual of income or expense arising out of the original deal.
As in all problems where the distinction is one of degree, the results
of the decided cases are far from_ consistent. What will appear to one
court as a substantial contingency will be declared inconsequential by
another. There are only a few types of situations where the courts have
been sufficiently consistent and enough cases have been decided to
allow generalizations to be made.
When an attorney takes a case under a contingent fee arrangement
no income can be accrued until a final decree has been rendered and
time for appeal has expired. 21 Nor can the client accrue any obligation
to an attorney under such an arrangement prior to final disposition of
the case.28 Such a contingency is considered too substantial to allow
accrual by either party.
Where the taxpayer receives payments under an option to purchase
26 Fairmount Creamery Corp. v. Helvering, (App. D.C. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 810; Simon
H. Scheuer, P-H T.C. Ms~i:o. Dsc. ,r43,206 (1943); Jenkins-Wright Co., Inc., P-H T.C.
MilMo. Dsc. ,r42,035 (1942).
2 7Est. of Lynch v. Comr., (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 747; Leland J. Allen et al.,
5 T.C. 1232 (1945).
2s Comr. v. Blaine, McKay, Lee Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 201. In Tobin
Packing Co., 43 B.T.A. 642 (1941), the taxpayer agreed in .1935 to pay attorneys a certain
percentage of the processing taxes saved if and when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
held invalid. After the tax was found unconstitutional on January 6, 1936, the taxpayer
eliminated from its deductions the unpaid processing taxes for 1935 but accrued its obligation
to pay the attorneys the percentage promised, and claimed a deduction therefor as an expense
for 1935. The Board of Tax Appeals allowed the deduction stating that at the end of 1935
the taxpayer had incurred a liability for at least the amount of the deduction claimed. "At
the end of 1935 all the events had occurred fixing the amount of a definite liability and the
contingency settled by the decision of the Supreme Court was that the amount w;is to be paid
to the attorneys instead of the Government." Id. at 644.
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which are to be applied on the purchase price in case the option is
exercised, but which are to be retained as damages or rent if the option
is not exercised, the amounts received are not income in the year
received but become income only after the option has been exercised
or the time for exercise has expired.20 Prior to that time it cannot be
told whether the payments represent income or a part of the purchase
price in a capital transaction. While this is not strictly a question of
accrual, it is a good illustration of a situation in which the realization
of income depends on a fuqire contingency that is sufficiently substantial to prevent immediate recognition. No case has been found where
the courts have passed on the opposite situation, that is, where payments are made by the taxpayer under an option to purchase, but it
is presumed that the same result would be reached.
Other than in these few situations little can be gained by reviewing
the decisions of the courts. To do so would only bear out the general
. rule that accrual is improper where liability is contingent but proper
where the contingency is insubstantial. As the question is one of
degree, the result in any case will depend upon the factual situation
and the theory of the court trying the case as to what constitutes a
substantial contingency.

C. A Third Party Claims Right to Receive Payment
Many times a situation arises wherein liability of the obligor is
established but a third party and the taxpayer both claim the right
to receive the payment. To protect himself in such cases the obligor
usually either withholds payment until the conflicting claims are
settled or pays the money into a depository or to a receiver to be held
pending settlement of the dispute. Many years may pass before the
dispute is finally settled and funds accumulated by the obligor or the
receiver during these years may amount to a very large sum. In such
a situation, if the income is not taxable to the fiduciary, may the taxpayer accrue as income for the year the amount withheld or paid to
the receiver, or must he wait until the final decree of the court upholding his right to receive the income?30
29 Hunter v. Comr., (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 954; Doyle et ux. v. Comr.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1940) llO F. (2d) 157, cert. den., 3ll U.S. 658, 61 S.Ct. 13 (1940); Birch
Ranch & Oil Co., P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. ,i44,128 (1944), affd., (C.C.A. 9th, 1946) 152 F.
(2d) 874.
ao If the income is taxable to the receiver this problem will never arise. But returns are
not to be made by receivers where they are in possession of part only of the property of an
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From the point of view of the taxpayer, following either course
may bring unpleasant results. If he does not accrue the income each
year as it arises, but reports it only after his right to receive it has been
confirmed by final decree of the court, his income for the year in which
it is received may be so large that, under the graduated rate scale, most
of the amount received must be paid out in taxes. On the other hand,
if he accrues the income as it is earned each year and his right to receive
it is not upheld by the court on final settlement of the dispute, he has
paid income taxes on income which he will never receive.
There is an important theoretical difference between this type of
situation and that in which liability of the obligor to the taxpayer is
contested by court action brought by the obligor. Here liability of the
obligor is not questioned but the issue is between the taxpayer and a
third party who claims to be entitled to the income. In spite of this
theoretical difference the disposition of the cases is the same. So long
as the obligor contested liability, accrual by the taxpayer was seen to
be improper. Here, so long as the third party contests the right of the
taxpayer to the income and its receipt is delayed by this contest, accrual
is improper.
The leading case on this point is North American Oil Consolidated
-v. Burnet.31 Among other properties operated by the taxpayer in that
case was a section of oil land, legal title to which stood in the
name of the United States. Prior to 1916, the government, claiming
also the beneficial ownership, had instituted suit to oust the taxpayer
from possession, and on February 2, 1916, it secured appointment of
a receiver to operate the property and to hold the net income thereof.
The proceeds from the operation were paid to the receiver as earned
during 1916. After the entry in 1917 of a decree by the district court
dismissing the government's bill, the receiver paid over to the taxpayer
the proceeds earned during 1916. The litigation between the government and the taxpayer was finally terminated by the Supreme Court's
individual [53 Stat. L. 60 §142 (1939)] or a corporation. No. Am. Oil Consolidated v. Burnet,
286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613 (1932). TRBAS. REG. 111, §29.52-2, "A receiver in charge of a
part only of the property of a corporation ••• need not make a return of income." As most
receivers appointed by a court or otherwise acting as depositories pending settlement of a suit
have possession of a part only of the property of a beneficiary, the income is normally not
taxable to them. Naturally there would be no accrual by a beneficiary of income taxable to
the fiduciary. If the fidu~ fails ~o report the income it is not taxable to the beneficiary
when later distributed. Graliam v. Miller, (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 507; Comr. v.
Owens, (C.C.A. 10th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 768; Benton Wilson, 33 B.T.A. 649 (1935).

s1 286 U.S. 417, 52 S.Ct. 613 (1932).
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dismissal of the government's. appeal in 1922. The income earned
from the property in 1916 had been entered on the taxpayer's books
as income for that year. The taxpayer claimed that the money paid
over in 1917 was income for 1916 or 1922. The Supreme Court held
that the profits were not taxable to the taxpayer as income for 1916:
"For the company was not required in 1916 to report as income an
amount which it might never receive."32
Since this decision, made in 1932, the prevailing view has been
that a taxpayer cannot accrue income which the obligor has withheld
or paid to a receiver to hold pending outcome of a legal contest for
ownership between the taxpayer and a third party.33 The courts have
stated repeatedly that taxpayers need not report income which they
have not and may never receive.34 That the courts are imposing a legal
test is easy to see. Accrual will not be proper so long as payment to
the taxpayer is withheld pending outcome of a suit by a third party.
The merits of the third party's claim are not considered; its existence
is sufficient to block accrual.35
This is substantially the manner in which the problem would be
handled by most accountants. Normally the presence of litigation will
cause an accountant to regard the taxpayer's claim as too contingent
for recognition by accrual. If the claim of the third party has no
legal foundation or is merely a nuisance claim, some accountants
might accrue the income as it is earned by the property with, perhaps,
a footnote showing the existence of the suit. This would serve to
82 Id.

at 423.

88 Income

from property was paid to a receiver to be held pending the outcome of litigation between the taxpayer and a third party claiming a right to receive it in Benton Wilson,
33 B.T.A. 649 (1933); Natl. Petroleum & Refining Co., 28 B.T.A. 656 (1933); Aubrey
Umstead, 28 B.T.A. 176 (1933), affd., (C.C.A. 8th, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 328; Trojan Oil Co.,
26 B.T.A. 659 (1932). Income was withheld by the obligor pending outcome of the litigation in Petit et al., 8 T.C. 228 (1947); Est. of Anthony, 5 T.C. 752 (1945), affd., (C.C.A.
10th, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 980; E.T. Slider, Inc., 5 T.C. 263 (1945); J.E. Farrell, 45 B.T.A.
162 (1941), affd., (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 193; London-Butte Gold Mines Co., 41
B.T.A. 852 (1940), affd., (C.C.A. 10th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 478. In some of these cases the
taxpayers were on the cash basis. The same reasoning is equally applicable to both accrual
and cash basis taxpayers, that is, the income is taxable to neither until settlement of the
contest, because prior to that time income has not been received and it is doubtful that it will
ever be received. It has been stated that for the purpose of this problem it is immaterial whether
the taxpayer is on the cash or accrual basis. No. Am. Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S.
417, 52 S.Ct. 613 (1932).
34 E. T. Slider, Inc., 5 T.C. 263 (1945); London-Butte Gold Mines Co., 41 B.T.A. 852
(1940), affd., (C.C.A.10th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 478; Aubrey Umsted, 28 B.T.A. 176 (1933),
affd., (C.C.A. 8th, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 328.
sc; E.T. Slider, Inc., 5 T.C. 263 (1945).
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prevent distortion of income by the existence of a suit which had no
legal foundation. Other more conservative accountants would re:.
gard the presence of any suit as interposing sufficient contingency to
prevent accrual prior to final determination of the court.
At one time taxpayers were allowed in a few cases to accrue income
as the payments were made to the receiver.36 This was on the theory
that the determination of the controversy in favor of the taxpayer
showed that the title to the property, hence to the income arising from
it, had always been in the taxpayer and the decree dismissing the claim
of the third party added nothing to the rights of the taxpayer. Thi.s
has been called the "pre-existing rights" theory and substantially is the
same argument that was discussed above in the cases where the obligor
was contesting liability. It has met with about the same reception in
both instances, that is, a few courts have agreed but most have disapproved. It was accepted by the Board of Tax Appeals in Brooklyn
Union Gas Co.,37 and the following quotation from that opinion is as
clear a statement of the theory as is to be found:
"We cannot agree with the theory that a taxpayer maintaining his accounts on an accrual basis may accrue as income only
those uncollected accounts pertaining to the current year in respect of which there is no contested litigation .... We think that
a taxpayer on the accrual basis who renders service in a taxable
year and asserts in that year a right to payment in a given amount
· is then cha~geable with income in that amount if, at the close of
that year, all of those conditions have been met, all those things
done, which give rise to the right asserted, irrespective of the fact
that the right may be contested and ultimate collection may be
postponed until some future year. In such case the right to receive the income is a right then perfected and the litigation later
concluded merely determines the right as having existed in the
former year."
In recent years no courts have accepted this theory and the law now
seems well settled that accrual is not proper so long as payment to the
3 6 Harris Oil Co., 13 B.T.A. 937 (1928); S. W. Harris, 2 B.T.A. 933 (1925). In
Obispo Oil Co. v. Welch, (C.C.A. 9t;h, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 860, revd., 301 U.S. 190, 57 S.Ct.
684 (1937), proceeds from oil lands had been impounded by the United States pending settlement of conHicting claims to the property. Settlement was reached after years of operation.
The taxpayer had accrued and reported the income received by the receiver during each year,
The court held that the taxpayer was entitled to percentage depletion for these years, thereby
indicating that the accrual of income during the period would have been proper.
37 22 B.T.A. 507 at 524 (1931), affd., (C.C.A. 2d, 1933) 62 F. (2d) 505.
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taxpayer is withheld pending outcome of litigation between the taxpayer and a third party.
In this situation the courts rarely speak of the presence of liability
as a prerequisite to accrual. Perhaps this is because the obligor is admittedly liable to someone, and to distinguish between liability to an
unascertained person and liability to the taxpayer would only confuse
matters. If such a distinction were made it would appear that the
same requirement of liability of the obligor to the taxpayer is present
in these cases. Furthermore, not only is such liability to the taxpayer
required to be present, but its existence must not be contested by a
third party in a court action. Following this line of reasoning, admittedly tenuous, it can be supposed that a mere claim by a third party,
not supported by court action, would also be sufficient to prevent accrual if it caused the obligor to withhold payment. Unless there is
some magic in court actions, there is no reason to distinguish between
payment withheld because of the presence of a suit contesting the taxpayer's right to receive the income and payment withheld because of
a claim unsupported by a suit. If the presence of a court action, no
matter how devoid of legal basis, will render eventual receipt of income
too contingent for accrual, then should not the presence of an unsupported claim have the same effect? No case has been found where the
question has been considered.

D. Amount Due Uncertain
Frequently the obligor is admittedly liable to the taxpayer but there
is a dispute as to the amount of the liability. Or, conversely, the taxpayer may have incurred a definite liability but at the end of the taxable year the amount of the liability is still uncertain. In such cases,
where liability is definitely established but the amount due is uncertain, is accrual proper?
It can properly be said that as a general rule an obligation may not
be recognized by accrual if it is unsettled in amount, or, as it is more
frequently expressed, that prior to accrual all events must occur which
fix the amount due. This was first voiced by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Anderson in 1926.38 There the Court indicated that
accrual would be proper when all events occurred which are necessary
to fix the liabilities of the parties and determine the amount of such
liabilities. Since that date this statement of the general rule has been
38 269

U.S. 422, 46 S.Ct. 131 (1926).
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repeated in almost ever:y case which has involyed accrual of an obligation uncertain in amount.
Equally well established is the rule that the exact amount need not
be fixed prior to accrual but that accrual is proper when all events have
occurred which make it possible for the taxpayer to estimate the amount
due with reasonable accuracy. This limitation to the general rule was
first mentioned by the Supreme Court in a dictum in Lucas v. American
Code Co.: "It may be assumed that, since the company kept its books
on the accrual b~is, the mere fact that the exact amount of the liability
had not been definitely fixed would not prevent the deduction."39
The first occasion on which the Supreme Court allowed accrual
where the amount of the obligation was not fixed exactly but was
capable of estimation with reasonable accuracy, was in Continental
Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States. 40 The Transportation Act of
192041 authorized payments to be made by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to those railroads which were not operated by the government during the period of federal control and which competed for
traffic, or connected, with one under federal control. The act directed
the Interstate Commerce Commission to compare the results of such
operation with those of a test period, defined as the three years ending
June 30, 19 l 7, and, if less favorable during the period of federal control than during the test period, to award an amount calculated as
prescribed by the act. The Transportation Act took effect on Februar:y
28, 1920, and on June IO, 1920, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued general instructions governing the compilation and submission of data by the carriers entitled to awards. At the date of the
act's adoption no railroad had any vested claim for compensation~ Until the Interstate Commerce Commission made an award nothing could
be paid and no proceeding was available to compel an allowance or to
determine the elements which should enter into the calculation. The
instructions issued merely set out the general principles to be followed
in making the award and did not cover the smaller details involved.
The Continental Tie and Lumber Co. _had operated its own railroad
from June 3, 1918, until Februar:y 28, 1920. It promptly claimed an
award, but the final finding as to the amount was not reached until
1923. The commissioner found that the compensation received under
the award was income for 1920. .The taxpayer claimed that it was
39See280 U.S. 445 at 450, 50 S.Ct. 202 (1930).
40 286 U.S. 290, 52 S.Ct. 529 (1932).
4141 Stat. L. 460 §204 (1920).

1949]

TAX AccouNTING

167

income for 1923, the year in which the :6.nal award was made. The
Supreme Court held that the taxpayer should have estimated the
amount of the award and reported that amount as income in 1920. It
thought that at that time the taxpayer could have estimated with rea- sonable accuracy the amount it would receive as all the information
used in the :6.nal award was then present on its books and the general
instructions governing the award had been issued during that year.
The discrepancy which would have existed between the estimate and
the :6.nal award could then be adjusted by an additional assessment or
claim for refund after :6.nal determination of the amount due. The Court
stated:
"The case does not fall within the principle that where the
liability is undetermined in the tax year the taxpayer is not called
upon to accrue any sum (Lucas v. American Code Co . ...), but
presents the problem whether the taxpayer had in its own books
and accounts data to which it could apply the calculations required by the statute and ascertain the quantum of the award
within reasonable limits."42
Most of the other earlier cases in which the courts were concerned
with this problem arose out of the operation by the federal government of railroads during and shortly after the :6.rst World War. Late
in 1917 or early in 1918 most of the country's railroads were taken
over by the president and were operated by him until February 29,
1920. The Federal Railroad Control Act of 191843 provided that the
carrier and the President might agree upon just compensation for the
use of the properties taken over. By the act it was to be an annual
sum for each year of federal control not exceeding the carrier's railway
operating income for three years ending June 30, 1917. This was referred to as the "standard return," and where this was accepted by the
carrier, the average annual railway operating income as determined by
the Interstate Commerce Commission was conclusive. By the same
statute, where the standard return was for any reason plainly inequitable as the measure of "just compensation," the President was authorized to agree with the carrier upon such amount as just compensation
as he should :6.nd to be just under the circumstances of the particular
case. The statute made no distinction between just compensation
based on the standard return or any other basis.
42

286 U.S. 290 at 296, 53 S.Ct. 529 (1932).
Stat. L. 451, c. 25 (1918).

48 40
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The railroads claimed to be entitled to more than the standard
return and practically all received more when the final settlement was
reached, in many instances not until 1922 or 1923. The railroads,
following the method of reporting suggested in an accounting circular
of the United States flailroad Administration dated March 1, 1919, had
reported the amount of the standard return each year of the operation
with a notation that this amount might be increased by a final fixation
of just compensation at a later period. When the compensation was
finally fixed, the railroads sought to amend their returns for the years
of government operation and to report the entire amount as income
for those years. The commissioner contended that the excess above
the standard return must be accounted for as income in the year the
agreement was reached, that is, the year in which the exact amount
was determined. The courts consistently found that the compensation should have been accrued as income for the years of federal operation and that amended returns should have been allowed by the commissioner. 44 The government was found to have conceded liability
to pay just compensation and not merely the standard return. Therefore, the compensation was not contingent on any future event, but
only the final ascertainment of the amount was deferred. Under such
circumstances the courts were of the opinion that it was reasonable to
account for the compensation as income for the years of actual operation. 45
These federal control cases and the Continental Tie & Lumber Co.
case firmly established the rule that accrual of income is not improper
when the amount due can be estimated within reasonable limits. That
44 Helvering v. Gulf, M. & N. R., (App. D.C. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 953, affd., 293 U.S.
295, 55 S.Ct. 161 (1934); Helvering v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., (C.C.A. 8th, 1933) 66
F. (2d) 633, cert. den., 292 U.S. 626, 54 S.Ct. 632 (1934); Comr. v. Midland Valley R.,
(C.C.A. 10th, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 1042; Comr. v. Old Dominion S.S. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1931)
47 F. (2d) 148.
.
4 5 In most of the federal control cases the returns for the years of operation were still subject to review at the time of the final agreements. In one case, Helvering v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., (C.C.A. 8th, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 633, cert. den., 292 U.S. 626, 54 S.Ct. 632
(1934), this rule was followed where the statute of limitations had run on the taxes for two
years of the period of federal operation and, as a result, the railroad concerned was not taxed
at all on the earnings in excess of the standard return for those years. There was a strong
dissent in this case by Circuit Judge Woodrough who thought that the Midland and Oil
Dominion cases rested on the theory that, since the whole period was within the statutory
period of administration and there was no question of the tax being collected on all the income
earned, it was reasonable to allow accrual of all the earnings in the years of government
operation. That the returns for the years of operation were still open to review was pointed
out by the court in the Old Dominion case so there seems to be considerable basis for this
dissent. However, certiorari of this case was denied by the Supreme Court.
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this rule applies to expenses or losses of the taxpayer is also well established.46
Since these decisions, the courts have been struggling over the problem of where to place those "reasonable limits," and, as could be expected, have disagreed. As the question is one of degree, nothing can
be gained by reviewing the decisions in search of a definite line of demarcation. Estimating an amount with reasonable accuracy is, after
all, a relative requirement. But in many types of situations there have
been sufficient adjudicated cases that generalizations can be made as to
the probable disposition of such cases in the future. These are generalizations, however, and in any of these situations a court may find, because of the facts of the particular case before it, that estimation with
reasonable accuracy is either possible or impossible. It must also be
remembered that in all these cases liability is definitely established and
the only uncertainty is as to the amount due.
In most of the early cases, including the federal control cases, the
final ascertainment of the amount due was to be made using information which was present on the books of account of the taxpayer at the
end of the taxable year. 47 At one time there may have been an indication that this was the only situation where accrual of an estimated
amount was proper, as the courts repeatedly pointed out in the federal
control cases and the other early cases that all the information used in
the final settlement was present on the taxpayer's books at the end of
the taxable year. However, it is now recognized that accrual prior to
final determination of the amount due is proper in situations other than
where the final settlement is based on the books of account of the taxpayer.48
Many times a taxpayer will have insured property destroyed by fire
or other casualty but at the end of the taxable year no agreement will
have been reached with the insurer settling the amount of the compensation. Accrual of an estimated amount of compensation is usually
found proper.49
46 Baltimore & Ohio R. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 4th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 456; Higgins Estate,
Inc., 30 B.T.A. 814 (1934), remanded, (C.C.A. 9th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 1011; Am. Fork &
Hoe Co., P-H T.C. MEMo D:sc. ,r43,431 (1943).
47 Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290, 52 S.Ct. 529 (1932);
federal control cases cited supra, note 44; Western Wheeled Scraper Co., 14 B.T.A. 496
(1928).
48 Frost Lumber Industries, Inc. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 693; Honokaa
Sugar Co., 43 B.T.A. 151 (1940); Am. Fork & Hoe Co., P-H T.C. M:sMo. D:sc. 1143,431
(1943).
49 Worstell Co., Ltd., 15 B.T.A. 413 (1929); Max Kurtz, 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927); G.C.M.
14666, 1935-1 CuM. BuL. 181.
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Normally a loss sustained by the taxpayer as a result of a breach of
contract cannot be accrued in the year of the breach because not all
events have occurred which determine the liability to pay and fix the
amount due. But, where within the taxable year there is a definite
admission of liability, negotiations for .settlement are .begun, and a
reasonable estimate of the amount of the loss is accrued on the books,
accrual in the year of loss has been found proper. Several early decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals50 allowing accrual in this very
special situation were approved by the Supreme Court in a dictum in
Lucas v. American Code Co.51
•
No recent cases allowing accrual in this situation have been found
and it should be assumed that, if accrual in such a situation is still
proper at all, the case must fit the exact situation presented in the early
cases.
If a sale is made and the purchase price is left to later computation,
the sale may be considered concluded for tax purposes on the date of
the agreement. An estimated amount may be reported for the year in
which the sale was made and the estimate later corrected when the
exact price is determined.52 This has been allowed when computation
of the amount depended not only on information existing at the end
of the year but also on information which could not be available until
well after the ·end of the year. In the Honokaa Sugar Co.53 case the
taxpayer shipped raw sugar to California, the sugar arriving on December 28, 1937. According to the contract between the taxpayer and
the refinery the title to the sugar passed to the buyer on arrival. The
amount to be paid was to be established according to the "average market price," such average being the average price for which raw sugar
was selling a short time before and after the date of arrival, and certain
other factors not necessary to be set out. When the taxpayer prepared
its return for 1937 it reported an amount which it estimated would be
received for the shipment. As provided in the sale contract the exact

°

5 Comr. v. Frazer Buick Co., 10 B.T.A. 1252 (1928); Raleigh Smokeless Fuel Co., 6
B.T.A. 381 (1927); Producers Coal Co., l B.T.A. 202 (1924).
51 280 U.S. 445 at 450, 50 S.Ct. 202 (1930). "A loss occasioned by the taxpayer's
breach of contract is not deductible in the year of the breach, except under the very special
circumstances where, within the taxable year, there is a definite admission of liability, negotia•
tions for settlement are begun, and a reasonable estimate of· the amount of the loss is accrued
on the books."
52 Schoellkopf Aniline & Chemical Works, Inc. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 417 (1933);
Honokaa Sugar Co,, 43 B.T.A. 151 (1940); Am. Fork & Hoe Co., P-H T.C. MEMO. Dl!c.
,r43,431 (1943).
53 43 B.T.A. 151 (1940).
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amount was not determined until November 30, 1938. The taxpayer
then reported the exact amount and sought to have the error corrected
in the determination of its tax liability for 1937. This procedure was
approved by the Board of Tax Appeals on the broad ground that since
the taxpayer's deductions for 1937 related in a large part to the production of the crop that was shipped and sold in that year, these deductions should be from the proceeds of the sales in 1937 as nearly as
possible.
.
The Honokaa Sugar Co. case was set out in some detail for two
reasons. First, it is a very liberal holding in that accrual of an estimated
amount was allowed when the final determination of the amount did
not depend on an appraisal of information existing at the end of the
year but on the market price at a later date and other details which could
not be established for a period of eleven months. It was notable also
because of the broad principle on which the decision was based, namely, that related items of income and expense should be accounted for in
the same year if possible. Although this general principle of accounting
obviously influences the courts when considering accrual while the
amount is still uncertain, it is rarely expressed as a basis for a decision.
If property of the taxpayer is condemned and taken over under
eminent domain power, accrual is not proper until the amount of the
award is fixed by a decree of the court or by an agreement between the
parties.54 It is thought that an estimate within reasonable limits cannot be made when the final award depends upon judicial proceedings
involving values placed on property by expert testimony.
That accrual is not allowed until final determination of liability in
a suit for damages has already been demonstrated. \tVhat of the situation where a final decree has been issued establishing liability but an
accounting before a special master is ordered to .determine the amount?
This situation most frequently arises in suits for patent infringements
and it is well settled that accrual is improper prior to the report of the
finding of a special master and approval of that finding by the court.55
This has been the holding whether the suit was for damages or to recover profits received by the infringer. The courts state that all events
54 Baltimore & Ohio R. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 4th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 460; Patrick McGuirl, Inc. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) 74 F. (2d) 729, cert. den., 295 U.S. 748, 55 S.Ct.
827 (1935); Luckenbach Steamship Co., 9 T.C. 662 (1947); Petit et al., 8 T.C. 228 (1947).
11 5 United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 56 S.Ct. 353
(1936), rehear. den., 297 U.S. 727, 56 S.Ct. 495 (1936); First Bancredit v. Flexlume Corp.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1934) IO F. Supp. 1015.
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have not occurred which fix the amount due, and distinguish the Continental Tie & Lumber Co. and the federal control cases on the ground
that in those cases the compensation was not dependent on any future
event but the books of the companies showed the income on which
compensation was to be computed pursuant to the statute. Since the
books of the patent infringer show the income on which the determination of the amount is made by the special master, at least in cases where
the suit is to recover the profits of the infringer, the distinction seems a
little unsound. What seems to be the real basis, although not articulated by the courts, is the feeling that the amount cannot be estimated
with reasonable certainty, whereas a much closer estimate was possible
in the federal control cases.
Thus it is seen that today the term !'fix" in the statement that all
events which fix the amount due must have occurred prior to accrual,
must be understood to mean "fix within reasonable limits." Since the
dictum in Lucas v. American Code Co. indicated that the exact amount
due might not need to be fixed, this concept has developed to the point
that accrual of an estimated amount was allowed, in the Honokaa
Sugar Co. case, where the amount could be fixed definitely only after
future events had occurred. While it is not always recognized, the
basic concern of the courts seems to be whether the amount due can
be estimated with rea~onable certainty at the end of the taxable year.
E.

Collectibility Uncertain

Where liability of the obligor is definitely established and is not
contingent on any future event, where no third party claims a right
to receive the payment, and where the amount due has been definitely
ascertained, but where there is doubt as to the ability of the obligor to
make payment, should the obligation be recognized by accrual? Stated
more briefly, is accrual proper if the collectibility of the obligation is
uncertain?
First, this problem must be carefully distinguished from that involved in cases such as Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner5 6
where the obligation is collectible at the time for accrual but doubt as
to its collectibility arises before the end of the taxable year. If an
obligation is good and collectible at the time the right to receive it
arises, it must be accrued and included in the taxpayer's gross income.
If it later becomes worthless or of doubtful collectibility, the question
56 292 U.S.

182, 54 S.Ct. 644 (1934), rehear. den., 292 U.S. 613, 54 S.Ct. 857 (1934).
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then becomes one of deduction according to the applicable statutes.57
Here, however, we are concerned with the situation where the collectibility of the obligation is in doubt at the time for accrual.
If collection of the item is uncertain only because of the normal
risk involved in all business transactions, accrual is required. If such
possibility of non-payment were to be accepted as a sufficient reason
for not recognizing an item of income, the whole theory of the accrual
method of accounting would fall where commercial transactions are
concerned. This seems so obvious that it is surprising that the courts
have found it necessary to state it on several occasions.58 On the other
hand, if the obligation is known to be uncollectible at the time the
right to receive it arises, the taxpayer is not obliged to recognize it as
income as it could hardly be contended that income has arisen when
the amount due can never be collected.
Between these two situations lie all those where the collectibility
is merely doubtful, where risk of non-collection is greater than that in
normal business transactions but uncollectibility has not been definitely established. Like many other questions involved in accrual
accounting, this is one of degree. How certain must ultimate collection be to warrant accrual of the obligations? Or, as it is usually expressed, how much doubt as to collectibility must there be before the
taxpayer can properly defer accrual?
Statements of the courts on this problem serve only to confuse.
Accrual has been said to be proper and necessary where the taxpayer
"was justified in having a reasonable expectation that payment would
be made in due course,"59 and where there was " 'reasonable expectation' . . . that the right to receive the interest would 'be converted into
money or its equivalent.' " 60 The taxpayer has been allowed to defer
accrual where "there exists good reason for believing that the income
can not be collected"; 61 where "at no time ... could the petitioner have
anticipated the collection of interest upon the notes" ;62 where there
"was no reasonable prospect that taxpayer would be able to collect" ;63
6 7 Ibid. See Am. Central Utilities Co., 36 B.T.A. 688 (1937).
58 Owner Register Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 6th, 1942) 131 F. (2d)

682; Taylor Distilling
Co., 42 B.T.A. 7 (1940); Arkay Drug Co., P-H T.C. MEMo. DEc. ,r44,364 (1944).
59 Automobile Ins. Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 265 at 267.
60 Broderick v. Anderson (D.C. N.Y., 1938) 23 F. Supp. 488 at 491.
61 Am. Fork & Hoe Co., 33 B.T.A. 1139 at 1149 (1936); Strickler Co., P-H T.C. MEMo.
DEc. f44,344 (1944).
62 Turners Falls Power & Electric Co., 15 B.T.A. 983 at 992 (1929).
63 Bulkley Building Co., P-H T.C. MEMo. DEc. 1!43,068 (1943).
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where "later experience ... confirms a belief reasonably held at the·
time the debt was due, that it would never be paid" ;64 where "in all
probability the income will not be received,"65 and where payment
_is not reasonably assured by " 'past experience, guaranty, anticipated provision or otherwise ....' " 66 From these statements it can
be seen that there is no established quantitative measure as to the
amount of doubt which warrants deferment of accrual. That the
courts have made no effort to set up such a standard is indicated by
the variety of statements made by the Tax Court and its predecessor,
the Board of Tax Appeals. Had the Tax Court attempted to set up
such a standard, the language of the case which it considered as stating
the proper measure would have been repeated in the subsequent cases
and the situation in the later cases would have been tested by this
measure. The absence of any great amount of similarity in the language used in its decisions shows that the Tax Court has made no
attempt to establish such a measure.
That this method of handling the situation is desirable is readily
apparent when thought is given to the great number of factors which
must be considered in determining whether an obligation is collectible. While no definite measure has been established, the general
tenor of the decisions indicates that the actions of a taxpayer will be
approved by the courts if there are reasonable grounds for his action.
If, in the opinion of the court, the taxpayer could have had at the time
the right arose a reasonable belief that the obligation could be collected, his accrual will usually be upheld. Conversely, if, in the opinion
of the court, the taxpayer had good grounds at the time the right arose
for believing that the obligation was unlikely to be paid, his deferment
of accrual will usually be sustained.
In theory the court examines the situation as it existed at the time
the right to receive the income arose and sustains the action of the
taxpayer if it is thought reasonable considering the information available at that time. 67 According to the theory, the court, -in deciding if
the taxpayer was justified in his action, does not use information
available at the time of the litigation but which was not available at
the time the right to receive the income arose. Whether the court can
successfully refrain from being influenced by later events is open to
64 Georgia School-Book Depository, Inc., 1 T.C. 463 at 469 (1943).
65 Com Exchange Bank v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 37 F. (2d) 34 at 35.
66 Great Northern Ry., 8 B.T.A. 225 at 269 (1927).
67 Automobile Ins. Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 265; Finucane

United States, 21 F. Supp. 122 (1937); Am. Fork & Hoe Co., 33 B.T.A. 1139 (1936).
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doubt. If it cannot, the taxpayer must not only have had reasonable
grounds at the time for his choice to accrue or not to accrue, but his
choice must be proved correct by later events. The courts seem to have
made a genuine effort to ignore information available at the time of
litigation but not at the time for accrual, but the taxpayer is entitled
occasionally to doubt that they are always successful. Indeed, the Tax
Court once made the statement that the taxpayer "need not accrue a
debt if later experience, available at the time the question is adjudged,
confirms a belief reasonably held at the time the debt was due, that
it ,,vill never be paid." 68
There have been relatively few decisions in which the courts have
been called on to decide whether or not an obligation appeared sufficiently collectible for accrual. That fact, the great number of factors
which bear on the question of collectibility, and above all the vagueness of the standard of "reasonable grounds"-if such a standard may
be said to exist at all-make a search for precedent almost useless.
Nor have there been any general trends in the type of situations in
which accrual has been allowed or disallowed. About the only situation which can be considered to establish conclusively that a taxpayer
cannot reasonably expect payment is that where a petition in bankruptcy has been filed. 69 \iVhile the filing of such a petition does not
always mean that no part of the obligation will be paid, it does create
too much uncertainty as to the amount which will be received for
accrual to be proper.70
It might be supposed that if the obligor were in fact insolvent (not
in itself an easy thing to determine) the taxpayer would be sustained
if he chose not to accrue the item on the ground that he could not
reasonably expect to receive payment. That insolvency of the obligor
68 Georgia School-Book Depository, Inc., 1 T.C. 463 at 469 (1943). This statement
might have been a slip of the tongue. It certainly is merely a dictum as the court in the decision considered only the information available at the time the right to receive the income arose.
69 Com Exchange Bank v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 34, sec. hear.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 508; Sowers Mfg. Co., 16 B.T.A. 268 (1929); Kem Realty
Corp., P-H B.T.A. MBMo, D.Bc. 1[42,455 (1942).
70 If the obligor is insolvent but the obligation is paid anyhow during the year, the money
received must be included in the gross income of the taxpayer. This sounds like a statement
of the obvious, but there was at one time considerable argument about it in instances where
the taxpayer had loaned the money during the year to the obligor with which the payments
(usually interest on bonds) were made. The courts consistently found the income was received when the payments were made. Here there was no question of accrual because the
money had been received but the situation is so similar to that under consideration that the
distinction should be pointed out. Am. Cigar Co., 21 B.T.A. 464 (1930), alfd., (C.C.A. 2d,
1933) 66 F. (2d) 425, cert. den., 290 U.S. 699, 54 S.Ct. 209 (1933); Langley & Co., 23
B.T.A. 1297 (1931); Southern Power Co., 17 B.T.A. 962 (1929).
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is evidence that the obligation may be uncollectible is admitted, but
it is not a determining factor. If the debtor, whether a corporation
or a person, continues in business and is making some improvement
in its :financial status, the courts may require accrual where there is
an indication that the improvement might continue. 71
Lack of an appropriation by Congress of funds to satisfy a judgment which the taxpayer has recovered against the government is not
considered as creating a reasonable doubt that the right would ever
be converted into money.72 The taxpayer is found to have a reasonable expectancy of receiving payment as the courts refuse to believe
that Congress will fail to make the appropriation eventually.
Up to this point only those situations have been considered where
the collectibility of items due the taxpayer is doubtful. \Vhat of the
situation where an obligation of the taxpayer becomes due but the
ability of the taxpayer to make payment is doubtful? Should the taxpayer accrue this item as an expense when there is no reasonable expectation that he will be able to pay it?
This problem was first brought to the attention of the courts in the
Panhandle Refining Co. case in 1941.73 There the taxpayer, an operating company, and its parent corporation were both on the accrual
basis of accounting. In the taxable years involved, 1936 and 1937,
the taxpayer accrued on its books large amounts of interest on its
indebtedness to the parent company. The taxpayer had been insolvent for years but most of its debt was to the parent for funds
advanced so that it could continue operation. The assets of the taxpayer amounted to several million dollars in value and it was engaged on
a large scale in the production, refining, and marketing of crude oil and
was attempting to make money to pay the indebtedness. In 1936 and
1937 its business had shown much improvement and the value of
its assets had risen sharply. It was, however, still insolvent. The
commissioner disallowed any deduction for the interest accrued on
the debt to the parent company on the ground that there was no
reasonable probability that it would be paid. The board sustained the
taxpayer and said the question is whether the taxpayer "may be deprived of the deduction of accrued interest because of its precarious
financial condition and the possibility, which in no event can be said
7 1 Greer-Robbins Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 9th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 92; Bettendorf Co., 34
B.T.A. 72 (1936).
72 Liebes & Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 9th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 932, I.T. 3165, 1938-1 CuM.
BuL. 158.
1s 45 B.T.A. 651.
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to be more than a probability, and is obviously not a certainty, that
[it] will never be able to pay such interest. We agree ... that so to
hold would be to add to the statute. . . . We may well take judicial
notice of the fact that the oil business is subject to great variation and
that [taxpayer's] extensive properties . . . might become sufficient to
pay interest and principal."74 It is seen that the board based its decision on the ground that there was a good possibility that the interest
would eventually be paid. Where such a possibility is found this
decision and its reasoning have been followed.
But is a deduction for accrued interest proper where there is no
reasonable probability that the taxpayer will ever be able to pay the
interest? In Zimmerman Steel Co. 15 the Board of Tax Appeals held
that it was not. The situation was similar to that of the Panhandle Oil
case, the only significant difference being that there had been no recent improvement in the taxpayer's £.nancial condition. After £.nding
that "there was no reasonable expectation of such obligation being
discharged in the normal course of business," 76 the board refused to
allow accrual of the interest. It observed that "the rule is that a taxpayer on an accrual basis is not required to report as income . . . an
amount which he may never receive," and, stating that "principles
pertaining to the accrual of income should also be applied to deductions,"77 it reached the conclusion that a deduction for the interest
would not be allowed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the Eighth
Circuit reversed with this statement:
"The law is that if a method of bookkeeping employed by a
taxpayer 'does not clearly reflect the income, the computation
shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion
of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income' . . . and the
real facts, not forms of entry, must measure the tax. But where
interest actually accrues on a debt of a taxpayer in a tax year the
statute plainly says he may deduct it. That he has no intention
or expectation of paying it, but must go into bankruptcy as this taxpayer was obliged to do, can not of itself justify denial of deduction in computing the taxpayer's net income. It is true that if a
man's gains at the end of the year consist of bad debts he can have
no net income to tax. But neither does he have such net income
if the interest on what he owes amounts to more than his gains."78
74 Id. at 656.
w45 B.T.A. 1041 (1941).

76 Id. at 1047.
77 Id. at 1045.
78 Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 130 F. (2d)

1011 at 1012.

178

MICHIGAN LAw

REvmw

[ Vol. 48

The Tax Court has indicated that it intends to stand by its decision in the Zimmerman Steel Co. case regardless of the reversal.79
In Millar Brainard, having found that there was no likelihood that it
would be paid, it approved the commissioner's disallowance of a deduction for accrued interest "on the authority of Zimmerman Steel
Co . ..."so
When confronted with this problem the Tax Court would examine
all the facts of the case to determine to what extent there is a reasonable prospect that the payments will actually be made. If it should
find that there was no likelihood that the items accrued would ever be
paid, no deduction would be allowed. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit would make a distinction between presently accruing
obligations which the taxpayer is unable to collect and presently accruing claims which he is unable to pay. According to it, good business
practice might require that the first not be reported as income, but a
debt cannot be written off by the taxpayer merely because it falls due
at a time when he is unable to meet it. The circuit court also points
out that insolvency does not in any way lessen the obligation of the taxpayer and the liability continues to modify the condition of the estate
into bankruptcy.
On strictly legalistic and logical bases it is hard to refute the
argument of the circuit court of appeals that a taxpayer does not have
net income "if the interest on what he owes amounts to more than
his gains."81 But there may be considerable merit to the position of
the Tax Court, although the reasoning of the board in the Zimmerman case, that the taxpayer should not be allowed to deduct the interest as an expense because the creditor could not accrue it as income,
is without much value. Consider the case where a corporate taxpayer
is insolvent but a very large part of its debt is to a parent corporation
and the interest due on this debt, amounting to a large sum each year,
has not been paid for several years. The parent may not seek to enforce the obligation for any number of reasons. If such a taxpayer
makes an operating profit for the year, should not it be taxed on this
profit without benefit of a deduction for the interest which it never
expects to pay and which the parent never expects to collect? To hold
79 Florence Pearlman, 4 T.C. 34 at 54 (1944), "With all due deference to the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, we adhere to the view expressed in Zimmerman Steel
Co•••. notwithstanding the reversal in Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner• •••" See
Butler Consolidated Coal Co., 6 T.C. 183 at 191 (1946).
so 7 T.C. 1180 at 1184 (1946).
81 Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Comr., (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 1011 at 1012.
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otherwise would be to allow a mere bookkeeping entry to control
substance in many cases.
·
Final resolution of this conilict appears to lie with the Supreme
Court.
To generalize, then, if a taxpayer could have had a reasonable
belief that an obligation was collectible, his recognition of it by accrual
will be approved. On the other hand, if he could have had reasonable
grounds for believing that it was unlikely to be paid, his deferment
of accrual will be approved. The taxpayer seems to be given considerable freedom of choice and his action is usually approved unless there
is a rather clear showing that it was without reasonable basis. This,
like all generalizations, is subject to exceptions in individual cases and
on occasion courts disapprove of the action of a taxpayer on seemingly
slight grounds. In testing the reasonableness of the taxpayer's choice
the courts use, or try to use, only the information that was available
at the time the right to receive the income arose. There has been no
quantitative measure set up, but in each case the action of the taxpayer is considered in the light of the circumstances. There have
been few decided cases and as a result trends in the decisions cannot
be observed.
Many accountants would handle this problem in a similar manner. If an obligation appeared reasonably collectible, an entry of the
full amount would be made in the appropriate receivable account at
the time the right to receive the income arose. The contingency of
non-payment would be taken care of at the end of the accounting
period by an entry in a reserve account for bad debts of a blanket
allowance based on experience. Under this plan individual accounts
would be charged off against the reserve as their worthlessness was
demonstrated.82 Other accountants might handle it in a different
manner by scaling down the obligation at the time of the first entry
so that the receivable entered would reilect the doubt as to the collectibility of the item. 83 Still other accountants would enter the item at
its full or face value but would make an addition to the proper reserve
account at the same time.84 The last two methods would not force a
choice between accrual of the face value of the obligation and no
accrual of any amount, but would allow accrual of the estimated real
82 PATON, EssENnALs oP AccoUNTINc 411 (1938).
83 lbid.
84 G1LMAN, AccoUNTING CoNCEPTs oP PROFIT 177
COUNTING 184 (1946).

(1939);
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value of the receivable. This method of placing a valuation on the
receivable which would reflect the doubtfulness of its collectibility has
much to recommend it. It is considerably more flexible than the "all or
nothing" method required by the income tax laws and would seem to
produce a more accurate picture of the income of the taxpayer for the
period. Its very flexibility, desirable in accounting for business purposes, would make unsatisfactory its use in accounting for income tax
purposes. The difficulties encountered by the courts when attempting
to decide whether the taxpayer had reasonable grounds for his decision to accrue the entire item are slight when compared with the
difficulties which would be encountered in attempting to decide
whether the taxpayer had put a valuation on the item which properly
reflected the degree of doubt as to its collectibility.
CONCLUSION

It has been seen that definite trends do exist in the handling of
these cases by the courts and that in many situations predictions can
be made as to whether accrual will be found proper. Not only are
these general trends discernible, but in many situations the courts
seem to have evolved rather definite legal tests by which the uncertainty qualifying the payment or receipts of a particular obligation may
be measured.
First, the courts require before accrual that liability must exist and
also must be recognized by express admission or the situation must
be such that deniaJ of liability is so improbable that the obligor's silence
is considered an implied admission. Second, if any third party claims
a right to receive payment and payment is withheld pending the. outcome of the dispute, accrual is found improper. In neither of these
situations do the courts consider the merits of the dispute or weigh
the probability of ultimate triumph by the taxpayer, but the mere
presence of any dispute is sufficient to render accrual improper. The
inflexibility of these requirements indicates that they have become
definite legal tests and that accrual is proper only where there is a
legally enforceable obligation which has been admitted by the obliger
or the situation is such that admission is implied from silence, and
where there has not been any claim to the obligation made by a third
party which will cause delay in receipt of the payment by the taxpayer.
If there exists any uncertainty as to the amount due, accrual is
allowed only where all events have occurred which make it possible
for the taxpayer to estimate the amount due with reasonable accuracy.
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Here also the courts have set up a standard by which the particular
obligation before the court can be measured but the measure is one
of degree and cannot be considered a legal test. A similar standard
of measure has been set up by the courts' requirement that the liability of the obligor not be subject to any substantial contingency.
While both these standards of measure admittedly involve measurement of the degree of uncertainty, they are none the less standards
of measure merely because the dividing line is broad and seemingly
flexible.
Only where the collectibility of the obligation is uncertain do the
courts appear to have failed to set up a standard of measure. It may
be that the number of cases is still too small for any standard to have
developed and that one will be forthcoming in the future, but the
courts' failure appears deliberate and probably results from a feeling
that a quantitative measure of uncollectibility would be impractical
in application. Instead the courts seem to examine the situation in
each case as it existed at the time the right to receive the income arose
and to sustain the action of the taxpayer if it is thought reasonable
considering the information as to collectibility existing at that time.
This development by the courts of legal tests and standards for
measurement of the degree of uncertainty can be criticized as an
attempt to render definite and certain something which is fundamentally indefinite and uncertain. It may be said that this is another
instance where the legal profession has substituted legal technicalities
for principles of accounting in what is basically an accounting question involving facts only.
All these criticisms are sound. The question of whether there is
sufficient uncertainty qualifying an obligation to render recognition
by accrual improper is fundamentally a question of accounting and
involves a choice based on a survey of facts. The courts have developed
some legal tests and standards of measurement (in many cases unconsciously, perhaps) and have substituted measurement by these for a
survey of all the facts involved in the case and a decision based on a
weighing of the probability anew in each case. Too much dependence has been put on previously decided cases and this has resulted
in the development and use of legal technicalities.
But, valid as these criticisms are, they ignore the fact that the
development of legal tests and standards of measurement is perhaps
desirable. While this development makes for inflexibility and frequently may result in considerable hardship in particular cases, it does
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make for certainty. It allows the taxpayer to make a choice of the
year for accrual with considerably more assurance that his choice will
be sustained than would otherwise be possible. Inflexibility is never
to be desired in tax matters, but neither is uncertainty. The critics of
the development of rigidity in the tax laws usually ignore the fact that
the price of flexibility is uncertainty for the taxpayer.

